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COMMANDER
AMPHIBIOUS GROUP NINE
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29 June 1945

From: Commander Task Group SEVENTY EIGHT point THREE
(Commander Amphibious Group NINE).
To : Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : (1) Commander Task Force SEVENTY-EIGHT
(Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force).
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet.
Subject: Action Report - MARIVELES-CORREGIDOR Landings,
15-16 February 1945.
Reference: (a) Com7thPhib despatch 070653 of February 1945.
(b) ComPhib Group NINE Operation Plan 4-45.
Enclosures: (A) Part II, Chronology of Events. -p.19
(B) Part III, Performance of Ordnance Material and Equipment. -p.26
(C) Part IV, Battle Damage. -p.29
(D) Part V, Special Comments and Recommendations. -p.31
(E) Part VI, Personnel Performance. -p.38

PART I

GENERAL NARRATIVE

1. The task contemplated by the MARIVELES-CORREGIDOR Operation was derived from General Headquarters Southwest Pacific Area despatch of 5 February 1945, Commander SEVENTH Fleet despatch of 6 February 1945, and Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force despatch of 5 February 1945. The Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force, Vice Admiral BARBEY, designated Rear Admiral STRUBLE as the Attack Group Commander for the operation on 6 February 1945.
2. The mission of this Task Group was to embark at SUBIC BAY, transport, protect and land the Landing Force, together with its equipment and supplies, at MARIVELES BAY on D-Day, to make subsequent landing on CORREGIDOR on D+1, and to support both landings by close gunfire, in order to open the entrance to MANILA BAY.
3. Task Group organization was:
Task Group Commander and O.T.C., Rear Admiral STRUBLE
(a) 78.3.1 Unit Flagship, Commander ZITTEL
INGHAM
(b) 78.3.2 Assault Transport Unit, Commander WILHELM
KILTY (F), CROSBY, SCHLEY, TALBOT, MANLEY
LCI(L) 966, 548, 609, 627, 980, 1018
(c) 78.3.3 LST Transport Unit, Commander CARSON
LST 632(F), 585, 586, 711, 754
LCT 722, 724, 729, 1068, 1071, 1076

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S E C R E T

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- (d) 78.3.4 LSM Transport Unit, Commander JOHNSON
LSM 18(F), 19, 21, 34, 37, 38, 39, 40
42, 52, 64, 139, 169, 203, 218, 257, 310,
311, 319, 138 20 LSM
- (e) 78.3.5 Escort Unit, Captain BROWN
PICKING (F), WICKES, YOUNG, CONYNGHAM,
CLAXTON, SAUFLEY, THATCHER, DYSON, CONVERSE 9 DD
- (f) 78.3.6 Minesweeping Unit, Lieutenant Commander KEEFER
SAUNTER (F), SALUTE, SCUFFLE, SCOUT, SCRIMMAGE
SENTRY 6 AM
YMS 363 (F), 334, 336, 364, 314, 6, 8, 53, 48,
50, 315, 46, 329, 335, 339 15 YMS
- (g) 78.3.7 Salvage and Rescue Unit, Commander HUIE
HIDATSA (F) 1 ATF
LCI (S) 688, 985, 987 3 LCI(S)
GRASP 1 ARS
- (h) 78.3.8 Control and Inshore Support Unit, Captain ARISON
FC 1119, 1133 2 FC
LCI(R) 225, 226, 337, 338, 340, 341 6 LCI(R)
LCS(L) 48(F), 7, 8, 26, 27, 49 6 LCS(L)
- (i) 78.3.9 Beach Party Unit, Lieutenant NORDYKE
Beach Party Number EIGHT
- (j) 78.3.10 LCM Transport Unit, Captain RICHARDS, U.S.A. 25 LCM
- (k) 77.3 Support Group, Rear Admiral BERKEY
PHOENIX (F), BOISE, CLEVELAND, MONTPELIER, DENVER 5 CL
TAYLOR, HOWELL, O'BANNON, JENKINS, FLETCHER, 9 DD
NICHOLAS, LAVALLETTE, RADFORD, ABBOT
- (l) 77.3.5 Commodore FARNCOMBE, R.N.
HMAS SHROPSHIRE (F), MINNEAPOLIS, PORTLAND 3 CA
CONWAY, EATON, DASHIELL, HMAS ARUNTA, WARRAMUNGA 5 DD
- (m) 70.1.5 FT Unit, Lieutenant TAYLOR
FT 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 356,
357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 372, 373, 374, 375,
376, 377 20 FT

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Serial 00874

S E C R E T

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The Planning Phase

4. In his despatch of 6 February, Commander SEVENTH Fleet set a tentative target date of 12 February 1945 for the landing at MARIVELES.
5. In compliance with the directives contained in the despatches from General Headquarters Southwest Pacific Area, Commander SEVENTH Fleet and Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force, representatives from this staff proceeded on 6 February to SIXTH Army Headquarters at TARLAC, for consultation. On 7 February, Task Group SEVENTY EIGHT point THREE representatives proceeded to the XI Corps Headquarters and tentative plans were formulated.
6. The time available for planning was very short. Planning was further complicated as the ground troops allocated for this operation were engaged in combat in the jungle areas to the northeast of SUBIC BAY and communication with the Army officers concerned was difficult.
7. On 8 February 1945, a conference was held on the INGHAM, attended by Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force, the Commanding General XI Corps, Commander Bombardment Group and representatives of the FIFTH Air Force. At this conference a number of the details necessary for planning were completed. Commander Task Group SEVENTY EIGHT Point THREE Air Liaison Officer went to MINDORO, to complete the close and indirect air support plans for the MARIVELES and CORREGIDOR Operations.
8. In conference with Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force and Commander Support Group, it was not contemplated that minesweeping of the reported field between CORREGIDOR and CARABAO ISLAND would be necessary. A broad outline of the Minesweeping Plan was agreed upon. The Minesweeping Task Unit Commander estimated that two days before the landing at MARIVELES, which meant three days before the CORREGIDOR landing, would be sufficient to accomplish the necessary sweeping.
9. The plan of sweeping provided for:
 - (a) The sweeping of areas inside the 100-fathom curve for the approach of the gunfire support ships to positions off MARIVELES and CORREGIDOR.
 - (b) The sweeping of the approach area in which the Assault Group would make the landings.
 - (c) The sweeping of MARIVELES HARBOR.
10. An Underwater Demolition Team was requested in connection with the minesweeping, but no team was available for the operation.
11. On 9 February, a new minesweeping plan was laid out, which contemplated an additional sweep of approximately the northern half of the reported field between CORREGIDOR and CARABAO ISLAND, commencing on the afternoon of D-1 and completing on the afternoon of D-Day. This change became necessary, as the Commander of the Support Group had decided that he would need a mine-swept area in that locality in order to carry out the gunfire support mission properly.

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12. The Commanding General XI Corps Area, by his Top Secret despatch 100958 recommended to General Headquarters that the target date be changed to 15 February 1945. This date was confirmed by Commanding General SIXTH Army in his Top Secret despatch 101101 to Commander Task Force SEVENTY EIGHT. In anticipation of this change, the Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force had, on 9 February, orally authorized Commander Task Group SEVENTY EIGHT point THREE to delay sailing of the Bombardment and Minesweeping Groups, which were scheduled to begin operations D - 2 day.
 13. The SIXTH Army directive required the XI Corps to:
 - (a) Land in the MARIVELES BAY Area on Southern BATAAN, seize and secure a beachhead and establish control over the southern tip of BATAAN, employing not to exceed one Reinforced Regimental Combat Team.
 - (b) To move one Reinforced Battalion to the MARIVELES BAY Area prepared for a shore-to-shore operation against CORREGIDOR on D plus 1, in conjunction with the attack of the 503 Parachute Regiment.
 - (c) On D plus 1, employing airborne operations and shore-to-shore operations from MARIVELES BAY Area, capture CORREGIDOR.
 14. Thus the landing force for CORREGIDOR on D plus 1 was to be landed in MARIVELES on D-Day, reembark on the morning of D plus 1 and then landed on CORREGIDOR.
 15. Headquarters XI Corps, on 10 February 1945, agreed to the selection of beaches for the landings - D-Day Beach: MARIVELES between FUCOT and MARIVELES RIVER; D plus 1 Beach: South side of CORREGIDOR, SAN JOSE Area, in the vicinity of South Dock.
 16. Commander Task Group SEVENTY EIGHT point THREE Operation Plan 4-45 was distributed on 12 February 1945. On 13 February a conference was held in the flagship of Unit Commanders and Commanding Officers, except the Bombardment and Minesweeping Groups, which had sailed to commence operations.

Operational Phase

17. The general narrative of the operational phase has been prepared to present a brief narrative of the operation as a whole, followed by brief narratives of each task unit.
18. Minesweeping and bombardment of the MARIVELES-CORREGIDOR areas was commenced on D - 2. The operations of the minesweeping units were supported by ships of the Support Group, which also conducted the bombardment. Both minesweepers and bombarding ships operated in close proximity to CORREGIDOR and across the entrance of MARIVELES BAY without enemy reaction.

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S E C R E T

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19. At the end of D - 2 Day, Commander Support Group reported that the operations had been completed according to schedule, with a good distribution of gunfire over the target areas. The scheduled areas had been swept with negative results except for 23 old American mines swept in the area northeast of LA-MONJA.
20. On D - 1 Day, the minesweeping continued with 110 Japanese chemical horned mines out in the field southeast of CORREGIDOR and eleven cut in MARIVELES HARBOR. The minesweeping had gone according to plan except in MARIVELES HARBOR, where repeated sweeps had been made due to the loss of sweeping gear on obstructions in the channel entrance. Commander Support Group arranged for early and additional sweeping in MARIVELES HARBOR for the morning of D-Day. The Task Group Commander delayed H-Hour by one hour, in order to allow more time for minesweeping.
21. YMS 48 and the destroyers FLETCHER and HOPEWELL were hit by gunfire from CORREGIDOR. YMS 48 was sunk by our own gunfire. FLETCHER was able to continue operations, HOPEWELL continued operations with the Covering Group until 17 February when it was detached for repair of battle damage.
22. LA VALLETTE and RADFORD were mined in the entrance to MARIVELES HARBOR. LA VALLETTE was towed to SUBIC BAY by HIDATSA and RADFORD was able to proceed there under her own power.
23. Sweeping operations on the north side of CORREGIDOR were discontinued for the remainder of D - 1 Day, as the covering group was unable to silence all batteries in the caves on the northern face of CORREGIDOR. Cruisers and Destroyers fired thousands of rounds into the caves and tunnel entrances, but they were protected by heavy masonry and were well camouflaged. When the enemy batteries fired only a smoke puff could be seen.
24. On D - 1 Day, large amounts of ammunition were required to silence the cave guns on CORREGIDOR. In order to make reserve gunfire available, Commander Task Group SEVENTY SEVEN point THREE, at about 0100 D-Day, was directed to order to the area, the heavy cruiser unit which had previously been alerted in LINGAYEN GULF. The heavy cruiser unit arrived in the objective area at 1230 D-Day.
25. The FIFTH Air Force was requested to delay the heavy air strike planned for MARIVELES on the next day until 0900, to allow the minesweepers more time for sweeping. FIFTH Air Force was also given the positions of three enemy guns on the north side of CORREGIDOR, which had fired on the Support Group and were not considered silenced. Heavy air strikes on these positions were requested for the morning of D-Day and were made in considerable strength.

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26. The Assault Group was divided into two echelons and sortied from SUBIC BAY on 14 February 1945 for the MARIVELES operation. The LCM Echelon, consisting of 25 LCMs, escorted by PC 1133, proceeded via a direct route from SUBIC BAY to MARIVELES HARBOR. The HIDATSA (ATF) and GRASP (ARS), originally scheduled to accompany the LCM Echelon, were detached in order to assist in towing the LA VALLETTE to SUBIC. The Landing Ship Echelon, which contained most of the other units of the Task Group, proceeded via a route to the westward of the direct route, to arrive at MARIVELES at H - 2½ hours.
27. In order to allow more time for the minesweeping in MARIVELES HARBOR on D-Day, H-Hour had been delayed one hour from the originally scheduled 0900. After three sweeps of the harbor were made with negative results, operations were continued on the basis of an H-Hour of 1000.
28. The first landings were made on schedule at 1000. Minor and sporadic machine gun fire was encountered from the MARIVELES beaches; shore battery fire of about 5" caliber from CORREGIDOR inflicted some casualties to our troops embarked in LCPs. These enemy batteries were engaged by supporting cruisers and destroyers and were silenced quickly.
29. The landing proceeded on schedule until the seventh wave of LCTs encountered some delay in retracting. The eighth wave, composed of LSMs, was, therefore, delayed at the line of departure and, while waiting to proceed into the beach, LSM 169 struck a mine. Flames enveloped the vessel, but the fire was brought under control by the excellent fire fighting service rendered by the GRASP. The LSM 169 was beached and subsequently towed to SUBIC.
30. After a short delay the remaining waves were landed at the scheduled intervals. The beach in MARIVELES HARBOR presented considerable difficulties for beaching and unloading amphibious craft. The unloading proceeded very slowly and the Landing Force Commander requested that every effort be made to expedite it, including unloading during the night.
31. By 1135 the last assault wave had beached. LSM 218, which had fouled her port screw with manila line enroute to the attack area, beached singly at 1330. There was delay in unloading her due to a scarcity of prime movers and she retracted some two hours later. The five LSTs were beached singly from 1509 to 1624. They were beached at standard speed of 9.5 knots at 40 yard intervals. The average distance offshore was 100 feet with 3 feet of water at the bow ramp. Meanwhile the six LCTs left the transport area and anchored south of the beach.
32. There was no enemy interference to the landing force from guns on CORREGIDOR after the firing which caused casualties in one landing craft prior to leaving the approach lane. The support force of cruisers and destroyers kept up intermittent fire on CORREGIDOR with occasional counter-battery fire throughout the day. Numerous air strikes, bombing and strafing were conducted over CORREGIDOR. Enemy opposition in MARIVELES was restricted to sporadic sniper fire during the beaching of the first waves of landing craft. There were no casualties.

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33. After beaching Army units deployed and advanced rapidly inland with little enemy opposition in the immediate harbor area. At 1400 Major General CHASE assumed command ashore. By 1500 MARIVELES Air Field had been secured.
34. In view of the Commanding General's desire for early unloading of the LSTs and as the LSTs did not complete unloading in the daytime, it was decided to leave them beached for the night with a protective screen of gunboats. Under the beaching conditions that existed it would not have been practicable to retract the LSTs prior to high water, due at 0115 on the 16th. LCTs were to remain anchored offshore. It was planned that other units of the attack force would retire for the night, to return shortly after daylight. All LSMs except the beached LSM 169 and LSM 213 formed in the late afternoon and proceeded under escort to SUBIC BAY.
35. Commander Task Unit SEVENTY EIGHT point THREE point EIGHT was directed to remain in MARIVELES for the night 15-16 February, to assume SOPA duties; to establish a tight screen across the harbor entrance for the protection of units in the harbor; and to stand by to render such fire support as might be required by the Army forces on the beaches. In view of the restricted waters, the LCS(L)s were anchored across the harbor entrance and alerted for picket duty. Other Naval forces retired to the westward with instructions to rendezvous off LAMONJA in the morning. Two destroyers remained in the area for the night on gunfire support and illumination duty. At the Army's request, interdiction fire was placed during the night on the road north of MARIVELES.
36. At about 0315 on 16 February a number of Japanese Q-Boats managed to close the five gunboats screening the entrance. The Q-Boats were not sighted by radar or visually. Three of the gunboats were sunk in the initial attack. The LCS(L) 27 sank five Q-Boats before a sixth exploded close aboard and damaged her. Quick action on the part of the Commanding Officer in beaching his ship saved her.
37. It was later learned from a prisoner of war that about thirty Q-Boats were launched from CORREGIDOR that night. The general characteristics of the Q-Boat: Length - 17 feet; beam - 46 inches; freeboard - 12 inches; crew - 1 man astern; war head - 300 pound charge in the bow, which can be detonated on impact or by the boatman; speed about 20 knots.
38. At about 0700, 16 February 1945, a small boat painted Army Green, bearing the number "122" and exhibiting a white star in the bow was observed dead in the water about one and one-half miles southwest of MARIVELES. The Task Group Commander directed the CONYNGHAM to fire on the vessel. After receiving a burst of 20 MM fire the boat exploded violently. It is believed that this was a Q-Boat.
39. At about 0800 25 LCMs, loaded with assault troops, were formed up off the entrance to MARIVELES HARBOR and departed at 0830 for the CORREGIDOR assault, escorted by Destroyers and under the direction of Commander BATAAN-CORREGIDOR Attack Group. Several floating mines were sighted along the route to CORREGIDOR; those were either sunk or destroyed by gunfire.

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40. At 0830 the paratroop drop was accomplished according to plan. Prior to the arrival of the paratroopers, heavy bombing and strafing of the CORREGIDOR DOME was carried out by Army B-24s, A-20s, P-47s, P-38s, and P-51s.
41. At H-Hour plus two hours (1030), the first wave of LCMs landed on BLACK BEACH, on the south side of CORREGIDOR. During the approach two underwater explosions occurred about 200 yards ahead of an LCS(L) preceding the first wave. Apparently the explosion was caused by the setting off of a controlled mine from ashore. The following waves of LCMs landed according to plan. Troops encountered land mines on the beach and some vehicles were destroyed. There was also machine gun and larger fire from the ravine to the west of the landing beach. This fire was taken under counter battery fire by our Destroyers and temporarily silenced. At about the same time machine guns and one enemy battery from CABALLO ISLAND opened up. Several shells of about 5" caliber fell in and around the transport area. One LCI(R) had her mast shot away. The machine guns and the battery were silenced by the Support Group and Army dive bombers.
42. The LCMs returned to MARIVELES HARBOR after the landing and, in passing LA MONJA enroute, came under enemy small arms fire. The TAYLOR was dispatched to the area and silenced the fire. About 1230 the second wave of paratroopers was flown in and landed on CORREGIDOR. At about this time the YOUNG, furnishing fire support in the northwest fire support area, received light fire from small enemy groups isolated on the south coast of BATAAN east of GORDA POINT. The off-fending fire was quickly silenced.
43. The initial approach of the two LCTs forming the sixth wave met heavy machine gun fire from the numerous and well concealed caves along CABALLO BAY. The LCTs retired to the line of departure until enemy fire was further neutralized. Notwithstanding the close and continuous fire support, the LCTs were under intermittent rifle fire which caused personnel casualties during the time that they were beached.
44. When the LCTs retracted about 1600, the ships retired to the vicinity of LA MONJA ISLAND, preliminary to forming echelons for the night retirement. In the meantime, on ORANGE Beach, the unloading of LSTs proceeded slowly. By dark three LSTs were ready to form up for retirement.
45. On D plus one night, two Destroyers were assigned to furnish gunfire support and star shell illumination for our troops on CORREGIDOR. LST 586, unable to retract; LCS(L) 27 and LSM 169, both damaged, remained in MARIVELES HARBOR for the night. All other shipping departed the objective area except the two Destroyers assigned Gunfire Support Duty and PTs operating on the east coast of BATAAN.
46. On D plus two four LSMs discharged cargo on the MARIVELES ORANGE Beach and two LSMs discharged cargo on CORREGIDOR BLACK Beach. One medical LST stood by for evacuation of wounded from MARIVELES and CORREGIDOR. The HIDATSA, engaged in salvaging LCS(L) 27, struck a mine in MARIVELES HARBOR, causing several personnel casualties and moderate damage to the ship. Two Cruisers and three Destroyers maintained gunfire support.

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47. At the request of the XI Corps, it was arranged to land the balance of the paratroopers on CORREGIDOR via ship. At 1630 on D plus two about 900 troops were landed from APDs. Machine gun fire was encountered at the beach from well concealed caves. This fire was countered successfully by the supporting Destroyers. One LCP(R) was sunk and two damaged. A few minor casualties were the only personnel losses.
48. Cruisers and Destroyers of Task Group SEVEN SEVEN Point THREE furnished call fire against selected targets on CORREGIDOR through D plus three Day, 18 February 1945. Thereafter, fire support was furnished by two Destroyers assigned each day from the Escort Unit of Task Group SEVENTY EIGHT Point THREE. On 24-25 February 1945, an additional Destroyer was furnished at the request of the Army to support a large drive by ground forces. Beginning with 27 February 1945, only one fire support Destroyer was required, as the requests for fire support diminished.
49. By D plus 4, our minesweepers had cut a total of 400 enemy chemical horn type mines, as well as 28 United States electrically controlled mines apparently from our pre-war fields.
50. The Second Resupply Echelon to CORREGIDOR was mounted at SUBIC BAY on D plus eight Day, 23 February 1945, with subsequent echelons scheduled at 6-day intervals.
51. The evacuation of the wounded was accomplished by sending one LST, escorted by a Destroyer, to CORREGIDOR daily and returning the wounded to SUBIC. This schedule was discontinued on 28 February 1945, at the request of the Army, as subsequent evacuation was to be accomplished by Army LCMs from CORREGIDOR to MARIVELES, and thence by air to Army Evacuation Centers.
52. Our patrols reached the east end of CORREGIDOR on 28 February. A total of 4,200 Jap dead had been counted by that time. It is understood later figures of Japanese dead reached over 4,800.
53. MANILA HARBOR was opened on 1 March 1945, and a number of ships, including Liberty ships and LSTs, entered that day.
54. On the morning of 2 March, CORREGIDOR was inspected by the Commander-in-Chief Southwest Pacific Area. The Commanding General SIXTH Army, Commanding General XI Corps, Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force and Commander Task Group SEVENTY EIGHT Point THREE were present. Cave batteries at CABALLO were still receiving attention from the five inch guns of the fire support Destroyer on that day.

Motor Torpedo Boat Operations

55. Prior to the minesweeping operations, the Motor Torpedo Boats conducted offensive sweeps in the vicinity of MARIVELES and CORREGIDOR, including one trip inside MARIVELES HARBOR. One engagement with a number of enemy Motor Torpedo or other type surface boats occurred, in which a number of the Japanese boats were damaged and we suffered some casualties.

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56. Motor Torpedo Boat operations were suspended from D - 2 to D-Day, to avoid interference with the minesweeping and fire support group. Commencing on D-Day the ITs conducted offensives against some of the minor fixed shore defenses that were not accessible to other fire support units because of the proximity of controlled minefields. They assisted with close support of the movement of troops across the neck of land to the north of BLACK Beach.
57. Close liaison was maintained by the Motor Torpedo Boats and the fire support destroyers stationed at the objective area overnight, in order to provide mutual support and knowledge of their respective movements. Motor Torpedo Boats were used to search in MANILA BAY, along the east coast of BATAAN, and destroyed a considerable number of Japanese attempting to escape from CORREGIDOR to BATAAN and LAMONJA.
58. During the landing of the 503rd Paratroop Battalion, some of the troops landed outside of the intended area and were on the side of the cliff in a position from which they could not regain contact with their battalion on top of The Rock. The Motor Torpedo Boats closed the shoreline of CORREGIDOR, rescued these paratroopers and then put them ashore on BLACK Beach.

Minesweeping Operations

59. The Minesweeping operations were conducted by Task Unit SEVENTY EIGHT point THREE point SIX, which was composed of six AMs and 15 YMSs. The Minesweeping Unit commenced their operations on D - 2 supported by the cruisers and destroyers of the Support Group.
60. By the end of D - 2 Day, the operations had been completed according to schedule, with negative results except for 26 U.S. Army electric control type mines, which were swept in the area northeast of LAMONJA. These mines were sunk by gunfire.
61. On D - 1, one of the units swept to within 1200 yards of CORREGIDOR, cutting 110 enemy chemical horned type mines. On the first pass, shore battery fire was encountered from CORREGIDOR, CABALLO and CARABAO ISLAND. No enemy hits occurred, although there were numerous straddles. The enemy batteries appeared to be 75 mm and 105 mm. The sweepers returned the fire and several hits were observed in cave entrances. Counter-battery fire from two fire support destroyers, two gunboats acting as mine destruction vessels, and from the cruiser support force effectively silenced the shore batteries concerned.
62. One unit commenced sweeping in the north channel, between CORREGIDOR and BATAAN. At about 1400 shore batteries on CORREGIDOR opened up on the leading minesweeper, YMS 48, receiving five or six direct hits, which started large fires on the ship. The remaining sweepers were ordered to retire and the destroyers FLETCHER and HOPWELL came to the assistance of the damaged ship. The FLETCHER removed personnel from the YMS and sank her by gunfire. Casualties on the YMS were one officer and two enlisted men missing and four enlisted men wounded. While the destroyers were rendering assistance to YMS 48, the enemy battery shifted fire to them and scored hits on both the FLETCHER and HOPWELL.

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63. One unit conducted sweeps in MARIVELES HARBOR. Repeated sweeps were ordered due to the loss of sweeping gear on obstructions in the channel entrance. Eleven chemical horned type mines were cut during the afternoon sweeps in the Harbor.
64. On D-Day one unit of YMSs made three round-trip sweeps in MARIVELES HARBOR with negative results. One YMS conducted a drag sweep, with the depressor streamed to 100 feet, across MARIVELES HARBOR entrance. One unit swept an area south of CORREGIDOR, cutting 154 enemy chemical horned type mines. Another unit conducted sweeps in CABALLO BAY in the afternoon. YMS 46, of this unit, was hit in the generator room by a three-inch armor piercing shell. The shell was a dud and did not cause any casualties.
65. Sweeping operations were continued until D plus 4 and without further enemy shore battery fire. By D plus 4 a total of 400 enemy chemical horned type mines had been cut. About 50 per cent of these mines appeared to have been laid within the last four or five months, while the remainder appeared to be much older. The newer mines were hot and exploded very easily.
66. On D plus 3 YMSs made another check sweep of MARIVELES HARBOR and discovered a heavy buoy about fifteen feet under water in the center of the harbor entrance.
67. On D plus 4 a sweep was made in the north channel between CORREGIDOR and BATAAN, to a depth of eighty feet, with negative results. Later, when Motor Torpedo Boats passed through the same area six mine explosions occurred, indicating the presence of an electrically controlled mine field. The north channel was closed to navigation. The Army on CORREGIDOR had been requested to search for mine control stations on CORREGIDOR in the North Channel area and for cables leading from the island. They reported locating and cutting a number of cables leading toward North Channel. The control houses had apparently been demolished by the air strikes and Naval bombardment.
68. On the first pass through the large mine field southeast of CORREGIDOR, the Minesweeping Unit cut 76 mines. The two gunboats detailed as mine destruction vessels were unable to sink the larger portion of these mines as they were cut. Due to the current at the time, most of the cut mines drifted over the unswept part of the mine field and the mine destruction vessels were, therefore, unable to follow and destroy them. These mines drifted with the current during the night and became an additional hazard the next morning. They were rapidly disposed of on the following morning by coordinated cruiser plane and surface vessel operations. No casualties were suffered from the floating mines. The cruiser planes, with their slow speed, proved to be an excellent means for observation of the floating mines.
69. These minesweeping operations were carried out in several instances under heavy shore battery fire from the enemy and attest to the fortitude of the minesweeping personnel.

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Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

File: FE25/416-3
Serial:00874

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Subject: Action Report - MARIVELES-CORREGIDOR Landing, 15-16 Feb 1945

Support Group Operations

70. The Support Group, under Rear Admiral BERKEY, was composed of five cruisers and nine destroyers for most of the operation. On D-Day three heavy cruisers and six destroyers augmented the group. This group was assigned the tasks of supporting minesweeping operations; pre D-Day bombardment of BATAAN and CORREGIDOR; counter battery fire in support of landings on D and D plus 1 days.
71. Minesweeping and bombardment was commenced on D - 2. Numerous mines were swept and both minesweepers and bombarding ships operated in close proximity to CORREGIDOR and across the entrance of MARIVELES BAY without enemy reaction.
72. The first opposition developed on D - 1, when the minesweepers and supporting destroyers received bursts of fire throughout the day. CORREGIDOR was bombarded heavily, and many shore batteries were silenced.
73. The U.S.S. FLETCHER, while engaged in sinking floating obstructions across the entrance of MARIVELES BAY by gunfire, was hit by a six-inch shell from CORREGIDOR ISLAND. Shell fragment's penetrated to #1 magazine and started a powder fire which was extinguished by the prompt and heroic action of members of the FLETCHER's crew in time to prevent an explosion. The FLETCHER was able to locate and obtain direct hits on the shore battery shortly after being hit. The FLETCHER participated in the shore bombardments on the three following days.
74. The U.S.S. HOWELL, while engaged in counter battery fire against shore batteries on CORREGIDOR ISLAND, proceeded to the aid of the YMS 48, which had been hit and was burning. The HOWELL was hit by one six inch, one five inch, and one three inch shell in rapid succession. On turning to retire from the area on orders of Commander Task Group SEVENTY SEVEN point THREE, she was hit again with a five inch shell. A small fire was started in TNT, from a ruptured warhead, which was quickly extinguished. The main battery director was made inoperative but fire against the shore batteries was continued with guns in local control. The forward fire room was inoperative but the damage was localized and the ship was able to proceed on two boilers. The personnel of the U.S.S. HOWELL displayed courage and excellent training in keeping the damage to a minimum and in carrying the battle to the enemy while under heavy fire.
75. The FLETCHER removed the personnel from the damaged YMS 48 and sank her by gunfire. At the same time she was firing on the CORREGIDOR batteries which had shifted their fire to the HOWELL and FLETCHER when they came to the assistance of the YMS.
76. The U.S.S. LA VALLETTE, while acting as support vessel for the minesweepers and engaged in destroying swept mines in the entrance of MARIVELES BAY, struck a mine which caused serious damage to the ship. Efficient damage control by the officers and crew saved the ship and enabled her to clear the dangerous area under her own power. She was later towed to SUBIC BAY by the HIDATSA.

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File: FE25/A16-3
Serial:00874

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - MARIVELES-CORREGIDOR Landing, 15-16 Feb 1945

77. The U.S.S. **RADFORD**, while attempting to take the mined U.S.S. **LA VALLETTE** in tow in the entrance of **MARIVELES BAY**, also struck a mine. Prompt and efficient damage control confined and minimized the damage and the ship was able to proceed under her own power to **SUBIC BAY**.
78. The only evidence of a controlled minefield across the entrance of **MARIVELES BAY** was that a section of electric cable was cut by one of the minesweepers making a drag across the entrance for the purpose of cutting such leads if they existed. While the mines which exploded under **LA VALLETTE** and **RADFORD** may have been of the controlled type, it appears more probably that they were unswept contact mines. A YMS or other small vessel should have been used for mine destruction in the sweeping of **MARIVELES HARBOR**.
79. On D-Day **CORREGIDOR** was bombarded between heavy air strikes. The landing at **MARIVELES** was supported by scheduled and counter battery fire. The single shore battery that fired on the APDs in the transport area was quickly silenced.
80. The landing at **CORREGIDOR** on D plus 1 was supported by a prelanding bombardment by the three heavy cruisers and screening destroyers before the paratroop drop. Several units were available for call fire on D plus 2 Day.
81. Task Group **SEVENTY SEVEN** point **THREE** displayed aggressiveness and determination throughout the operation. Gunnery was of the highest caliber, which combined with the heavy air strikes and the close supporting fire of other units enabled the troops to land with a few casualties during the assault on both **MARIVELES** and **CORREGIDOR**.

Escort Unit Operations

82. The Escort Unit of the **BATAAN-CORREGIDOR** Attack Group, Task Unit **78.3.5**, initially included six destroyers: ComDesDiv 49 in U.S.S. **PICKING**, U.S.S. **YOUNG**, U.S.S. **WICKES**, U.S.S. **SAUFLEY**, U.S.S. **CLAXTON**, and U.S.S. **CONYNGHAM**. On 16 February ComDesDiv 49 in U.S.S. **PICKING**, U.S.S. **WICKES**, and U.S.S. **YOUNG** departed for **LEYTE** on being relieved by ComDesDiv 46 in U.S.S. **CONVERSE**, U.S.S. **THATCHER** and U.S.S. **DYSON**. At this time in order that all activities be properly controlled the senior destroyer commander of the fire support destroyers actually on station off **CORREGIDOR ISLAND** at any time was given the designation **OTU 78.3.11**. Two or more destroyers were on station at a time until **CORREGIDOR ISLAND** was secured.
83. On 13 and 14 February destroyers of Task Unit **78.3.5** covered AMs and YMSs of Task Unit **78.3.6** during sweeping operations in the vicinity of **MARIVELES HARBOR** and **CORREGIDOR**. They provided counter battery and covering fire when in range of enemy shore emplacements.
84. On 13 February U.S.S. **PICKING** and U.S.S. **YOUNG** were designated for this task. No enemy shore fire was encountered but several suspected pillboxes and caves on the Southwestern face of **CORREGIDOR** were taken under fire by the two ships.

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Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

File: FE25/416-3
Serial:00374

S E C R E T

Subject: Action Report - MARIVELES-CORREGIDOR Landings, 15-16 Feb 1945

85. On 14 February U.S.S. WICKES and U.S.S. YOUNG supported the minesweepers and considerable enemy fire was directed at the group from Southern CORREGIDOR, CABALLO, and CANAFEO ISLANDS. Vigorous counter battery by the destroyers wiped out at least two emplacements and silenced the remainder, enabling the minesweepers to accomplish their mission without damage.
86. On 15 February (D Day) U.S.S. PICKING and U.S.S. WICKES carried out scheduled bombardment of MARIVELES HARBOR in support of the assault, covering damaged buildings, hills, and bushes in the vicinity of the shore line and the landing beach. Because of the narrow entrance to the bay and the high ground on either side it was necessary that the U.S.S. PICKING take station to the left line of departure 200 - 300 yards off COCHINOS POINT and the U.S.S. WICKES take station inside of the bay adjacent to right shore. The ships lay to, using their engines to keep batteries bearing and to maintain precise station hampered by current and a brisk wind. It required ship handling of the most expert character. During the unloading phase U.S.S. PICKING destroyed a contact mine and received survivors from the mined LSM 169.
87. On 16 February U.S.S. PICKING, U.S.S. YOUNG, and U.S.S. WICKES carried out scheduled bombardment of CORREGIDOR ISLAND in support of the assault, covering caves in cliffs to the left of the boat lane, the landing area, and caves and pill boxes to the right of the landing area. The bombardment was carried out at ranges from 1000 to 1500 yards and was very effective allowing the troops to land with few casualties. They were subjected to fire from shore batteries, and to the dangers of floating and controlled mines during the operation. However, the ships were sufficiently alert that they sustained no damage and caused the enemy considerable damage.
88. On 17 February U.S.S. CLAXTON supported reinforcement troop landings on CORREGIDOR by maneuvering to within a few hundred yards of the left of the landing beach and silencing heavy machine gun fire from RAMSEY RAVINE which had been strafing the landing craft. This required expert navigation and alertness on the part of the CLAXTON to discover the source of fire.
89. After the assault on CORREGIDOR two or more destroyers were on station at a time available for call fire, night illumination, and fire on targets of opportunity until the island was secured. The senior destroyer was designated CTU 78.3.11 and was charged with coordinating all naval activities in that area. U.S.S. CONVERSE, U.S.S. THATCHER, U.S.S. DYSON, U.S.S. CLAXTON and U.S.S. SAUFLEY took part in the call fire phase of the CORREGIDOR action.
90. Communications were excellent and close coordination was maintained with the forces ashore by means of the NGLO's who deserve considerable credit for their part in the recapture of CORREGIDOR.
91. Destroyers usually fired at range of about 1000 yards, with targets plainly visible to both firing ship and the spotter ashore. Numerous pill boxes and caves were destroyed. Concentrations of Jap troops were taken under fire and eliminated, and the advance of our troops closely covered.

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File: FE25/A16-3

Serial:00374

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - MARIVELES-CORREGIDOR Landings, 15-16 Feb 1945

92. The slow deliberate fire at very short ranges by the destroyers in this phase of the operation utilized the ammunition expended to the maximum extent. It was found that very few rounds were needed per pill box or cave. Excellent results at these short ranges were obtained with one shot at a time from a 40 mm with local pointing.

93. The necessary escort duties were performed by this unit.

APD, LSM and LST Operations

94. Due to the employment of the Army troops in combat operation until a few days before the landing, the time available for loading the APDs, LSMs and LSTs was limited. However, the sortie was accomplished without undue delay and passage to the objective area completed without incident.

95. A line of approach, as close to COCHINOS POINT as offshore navigational dangers permitted, was established. This line was at right angles to the boat lane into MARIVELES HARBOR. The ninety-degree angle in the line of approach to the beach was accepted, in order to keep the assault waves as far from CORREGIDOR fire as practicable.

96. During the formation of the initial wave in the transport area, a battery on CORREGIDOR opened fire with four salvos, which caused casualties in one loaded LCVP. The Fire Support Group promptly silenced the battery.

97. The waves formed in succession in column on the line of approach, turning into the boat lane by column movement. Upon arrival at the line of departure, the wave columns deployed into line for the assault.

98. The landing was made on schedule until the eighth wave, when a delay occurred due to the late retraction of the previous LCT wave. At this time LSM 169, forming part of the eighth wave, struck a mine which caused a large hole forward and started a large fire. The Salvage and Rescue Group rendered prompt aid and beached the vessel. After a short delay, the remaining waves resumed landings at scheduled intervals. The LSMs not organized in the assault waves, were on call and were beached as slots became available.

99. After unloading, the APDs and LSMs were returned to SUDIC, where they were to be ready to lift a reserve regiment, less one battalion, with supplies and equipment, in case the need for such reinforcement arose. Eight LSMs were beached immediately on their return, to load for the D plus 2 Resupply.

100. The LSTs were on call as slots became available. Unfavorable beaching conditions existed in MARIVELES HARBOR for LSTs, and considerable time was employed in reconnaissance to locate slots. After the best slots had been located, the unfavorable conditions reduced the progress of LST unloading to such an extent that late in the afternoon little supplies and equipment had been removed from any of the LSTs. It was also apparent that the loaded LSTs could not be retracted until high water, due at 0115 that night.

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By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

File: FE25/A16-3
Serial:00374

S E C R E T

Subject: Action Report - MARIVELES-CORREGIDOR Landings, 15-16 Feb 1945

101. During the afternoon of D plus 1, the two tugs of the Salvage Unit, assisted by LCI(S)s, aided the LSTs in MARIVELES HARBOR to retract. By 2030 four of the LSTs had been retracted, but the Salvage Unit was unable to retract LST 586. The Salvage Unit departed, leaving LST 586 on the beach for the night. Instructions concerning night protection were issued.
102. In view of the satisfactory progress on CORREGIDOR after the air and amphibious landings, the original plan of flying in paratroop reinforcements was changed to land them amphibiously. By prompt action, the APDs were able to load the paratroop reinforcement at SUBIC and land them at BLACK BEACH on CORREGIDOR on the afternoon of D plus 2, a day earlier than had been anticipated. The support and control arrangements used in the initial landing on CORREGIDOR were retained, with minor modifications, for the reinforcement landing.
103. On D plus 2, two resupply LSMs had been beached at CORREGIDOR and their unloading was proceeding without opposition. When the reinforcement landing commenced, rifle and machine gun fire from caves located on the west flank of the boat lane developed upon the approach of the landing craft to the beach. The gunfire support units and, in particular, the destroyer stationed on the west flank of the boat lane to fire up RAMSEY RAVINE, quickly opened fire on the Japanese positions. Their aggressive action permitted the landing to be made with only minor casualties to personnel, but no losses, and the damage of three small landing boats.
- Army LCMs
104. Twenty-five Army LCMs were assigned to this operation and embarked troops and equipment at SUBIC BAY on D - 1. Upon completion of loading, they proceeded to the anchorage of Task Unit 78.3.7, where they moored to the ships of Task Unit 78.3.7 until time of departure for the objective area. This Task Unit, comprising a fleet tug, a rescue tug and three salvage LCIs, was assigned the duty of escort for the LCMs.
105. Prior to getting underway on D-Day, the services of the two tugs were needed in assisting the damaged LA VALLETTE and RADFORD to return to SUBIC. Accordingly, the PC 1119 was detached from the escort of the Landing Ship Echelon, with orders to proceed SUBIC and assume the duties of escort commander for the LCMs, as the tugs were being ordered to report to the damaged destroyers.
106. The passage to the objective area was made without incident. The LCMs formed promptly in the designated waves and beached as directed by the Control Vessel for the MARIVELES assault.
107. These same LCMs embarked troops and equipment of the 3rd Battalion, 34 RCT, from MARIVELES on the next morning, D plus 1, for the landing on CORREGIDOR. The LCMs composed the principal amphibious components of the assault on BLACK BEACH at CORREGIDOR.
108. The LCMs, accompanied by escort and support ships, proceeded from MARIVELES to the southward of CORREGIDOR on a track to keep the formation out of range of small caliber weapons. The landing craft, flanked by the support craft, entered the boat lanes and deployed in an excellent manner for the assault. Most of the resistance to the landing by small arm and machine guns was overcome by the

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File: FE25/416-3
Serial:00874

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - MARIVELES-CORREGIDOR Landings, 15-16 Feb 1945.

Naval gunfire support.

Beach Party Operations

109. The land forces and equipment to be employed were engaged in combat service until just before loading for the operation. LSTs and LSMs were beached at SUBIC BEACH and other amphibious craft at RIFLE RANGE BEACH. With close coordination of the Shore and Beach Parties, the loading was completed so that both echelons departed on schedule.
110. ORANGE BEACH in MARIVELES BAY presented considerable difficulties to the unloading of amphibious craft larger than LCMs. The small gradient produced wet ramp landings and the soft sand on the beach provided traction only to tractors and DUKWs. These conditions slowed the unloading considerably. The lack of thorough waterproofing drowned out many of the vehicles that were towed ashore by tractors.
111. Both the Beach Party and the Shore Party were unprepared to receive the first resupply on D plus 2 and before this unpreparedness was corrected several hours were lost. In subsequent resupply echelons this condition was corrected.

Control and Inshore Support Operations

112. The Control and Inshore Support Unit was composed of two PCs, six rocket LCIs and six gunboats.
113. The control of the boat waves for both the MARIVELES and CORREGIDOR landings functioned smoothly.
114. The LCI(R)s and LCS(L)s rendered close fire support in both the MARIVELES and CORREGIDOR assaults from restricted waters adjacent to the landing beaches which would not have been accessible to other supporting types.
115. In the CORREGIDOR landing a heavy rocket barrage and also close support was furnished by vessels of this unit in the face of heavy enemy fire at short range. This support was a considerable factor in allowing the troops to land with few casualties.
116. The harbor entrance of MARIVELES was protected by a close screen of five gunboats on the night of D-Day. The harbor was attacked by enemy Q-Boats, who were not sighted by the gunboats either by radar or visually until they were practically alongside. Three of the gunboats were sunk in the initial attack. The LCS(L) 27, by alert action, sank five Q-Boats before a sixth exploded close aboard and damaged her. Quick action on the part of the Commanding Officer in beaching his ship saved her.
117. During the run ahead of the leading boat wave in the CORREGIDOR assault, the LCI(R) 393 was hit four times by three inch high explosive projectiles. The LCI(R) 393 continued in with the assault, applying damage control measures. She fired her rockets and took several enemy batteries under fire with her 40 mm and machine gun batteries. The ship cleared the area under her own power.

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By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - MARIVELES-CORREGIDOR Landings, 15-16 Feb 1945

Salvage and Rescue Operations

118. The Salvage and Rescue Unit consisted of two tugs and three LCI(S)s.
119. This Unit had been scheduled to escort the Army LCMs from SUBIC to MARIVELES HARBOR for the assault. The two tugs were diverted from their assignment and sent to the assistance of the LA VALLETTE and RADFORD in the early evening of 14 February. The GRASP completed her task with the RADFORD in time to join the LCM Echelon for the assault. The HIDATSA took the LA VALLETTE in tow off LAKUNJA ISLAND about midnight. The LA VALLETTE was down by the bow but, with careful seamanship, was towed to SUBIC. The HIDATSA returned to the assault area promptly.
120. During the assault phase in MARIVELES BAY, the LSM 169 struck a mine and caught fire, which spread to the magazine and to gasoline and oil stored in the vessel and in the Army vehicles aboard her. The GRASP, LCI(S)s 987 and 688, closed immediately and, notwithstanding exploding ammunition, fought the fire and towed the ship clear of the boat lane and beached her. She was later salvaged and towed to SUBIC BAY on 17 February. Quick action by the vessels of the Salvage and Rescue Unit probably saved this LSM from being destroyed.
121. The LCS(L) 27 had been beached to prevent sinking after an attack by suicide boats on the night of 15-16 February. Temporary repairs had subsequently been made by the Salvage and Rescue Unit. The HIDATSA struck a mine on 17 February near the western shore of MARIVELES BAY, while taking the LCS(L) 27 in tow. The HIDATSA was heavily damaged forward and set on fire. The ship's company were prompt and efficient in applying damage control measures and undoubtedly saved their ship from sinking.
122. The Unit repaired underwater hull damage received by the assault craft from shell fragments during the CORREGIDOR landing. They replaced propellers on landing craft, removed fouled lines from others, and assisted the amphibious shipping at MARIVELES to retract. A large net buoy submerged below the surface in the entrance to the harbor was blown up by divers from LCI(S) 227, who placed 100 pounds of explosives on the net buoy. This buoy had been obstructing the minesweeping at the harbor entrance. The ships of this Unit were very prompt in rendering assistance to damaged ships and in making temporary repairs.

Further Operations

123. Task Group SEVENTY-EIGHT point THREE was dissolved as of 0001 ITEM 4 March 1945. Support of further operations was continued under Commander Task Force SEVENTY-EIGHT.

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CIC
Com7thFlt (Advance)
AdCom7thFlt

A. D. STRUBLE

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COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS GROUP NINE
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Enclosure (A) to Commander Task Group 78.3 MARIVELES-CORREGIDOR Action Report

PART II

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS - MARIVELES-CORREGIDOR OPERATION

COMMANDER TASK GROUP 78.3 ON U.S.C.G.C. INGHAM

6 February 1945

Despatch received from CTF 78, initiating BATAAN-CORREGIDOR Operation and designating Rear Admiral STRUBLE as Attack Group Commander. Chief of Staff, Air Officer and Intelligence Officer departed from the Flagship to report to the SIXTH Army Headquarters for preliminary planning.

7 February 1945

Planning group departed SIXTH Army Headquarters for XI Corps Headquarters and return to Flagship.

8 February 1945

Conference on Flagship with Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force, Commanding General XI Corps and representatives, 5th AAF representative and 503rd Parachute Infantry Division representatives.

13 February 1945

0930 Briefing conference held on Flagship.

1200 Loading of equipment commenced on this date.

14 February 1945 (D-1)

1703 LSTs finish loading. Tug ordered to assist them off beach.

1708 The Flagship and Landing Ship Echelon of the assault force got underway for objective area, departing SUBIC BAY.

2000 Ships formed cruising disposition.

2225 CTG 77.3, in charge of Bombardment Group, advises Assault Group Commander that the volume of gunfire from CORREGIDOR during the afternoon makes more neutralization bombardment advisable before the landing, and that his ammunition expenditures had been very heavy. Air strikes failed to reach some of the guns. Often not even the flash of the guns could be seen. The batteries were located from puffs of smoke at the mouth of the caves in which the guns were hidden. The shore batteries chose the smaller ships as targets.

Enclosure (A)

- 1 -

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

19

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2225 to

2400 Proceeding on various courses and speeds.

15 February 1945 (D-Day)

0200 LCM Echelon departed SUBIC.

0730 All ships informed that H-Hour is to be 1000.

0744 CTG 77.3 reports silencing one CORREGIDOR battery after one shot was fired by it. He reported another visible and believes it can be knocked out in an hour.

0757 10 A-20s and 20 B-24s are reported coming in.

0800 Cruisers report no more gunfire from north side of CORREGIDOR.

0804 Two mines are observed washed up on the MARIVELES BEACH.

0810 Second gun on CORREGIDOR reported silenced by cruisers.

0818 CTG 77.3 reports negative results on sweep of MARIVELES BAY.

0824 Cruisers report two 6" guns firing on them from CORREGIDOR.

0852 Force ordered to land the Landing Force.

0858 APDs are disembarking troops. PC 1119 and PC 1133 are on station marking line of departure.

0859 6 P-38s and 6 P-47s with bombs begin attack on north face of CORREGIDOR.

0904 Four shots of about 4" caliber from a battery on CORREGIDOR splashed near the APD 14. No direct hits, although fragments caused 17 casualties in one landing boat. Cruisers instantly took battery under fire and silenced it before any more shots could be fired. Aim of the CORREGIDOR shore batteries which did fire was good.

0912 First wave nears line of departure.

0913 Prearranged bombardment of MARIVELES BAY shore begins by Destroyers.

0922 B-24s bomb MARIVELES BAY area. Excellent pattern obtained.

0947 First wave leaves line of departure for beach.

1000 H-Hour, first wave of 8 LCVs land on MARIVELES Beach. Opposition reported very light. Further waves continue.

Enclosure (A)

- 2 -

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

20

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Enclosure (A) to Commander Task Group 78.3 MARIVELES-CORREGIDOR Action Report

- 1010 On CORREGIDOR, 12 P-38s have bombed the gun positions on the northern face of the island. This report was received from the Air Observer who proceeded to mark a good gunfire target with a small bomb.
- 1037 Destroyer sinks mine by gunfire close to beach.
- 1038 LSM 169, half-way into beach, explodes, and is enveloped by flames. Ship stops, men jumping overboard. Salvage ship proceeding to put out fires. Appears to be a mine, although with some characteristics of mortar fire. Eighth wave is stopped at line of departure. Ninth wave is also held up.
- 1044 LCMs near LSM 169 pick up survivors. Water is played on fire. The ship's back is broken and there is a hole in the port bow.
- 1054 Because of difficulty of retraction, LSM 34 suggests one-third maximum speed for beaching.
- 1101 Heavy bombing attack on CORREGIDOR.
- 1118 HIDATSA requests permission to beach LSM 169. Only 6 casualties reported.
- 1127 CTG 77.3 reports Target X-ray, one of the main batteries on CORREGIDOR during early morning, is now covered over with rock slides and destroyed.
- 1135 Eleventh wave, final assault wave, lands. CTG 78.3 reports to CTF 77 and CTF 78 regarding poor beaching conditions.
- 1150 Bombing on CORREGIDOR is resumed by 12 A-20s.
- 1158 Sweepers report cutting 12 mines on first pass through northern part of Southern Channel (Area "JANE") a total of 78 enemy mines have been cut to date.
- 1200 Reconnaissance fails to show any large organized enemy force.
- 1210 CORREGIDOR is bombed again. Almost continuous bombing is in progress. Commenced unloading LSMs on call.
- 1230 Heavy Cruisers of Task Group 77.3 arrive off CORREGIDOR from LINGAYEN.
- 1330 General CHASE and staff leave the Flagship.
- 1400 General CHASE assumed command ashore, relieving Rear Admiral STRUBLE.
- 1425 Caves reported on CORREGIDOR with steel doors; some are open, some closed. 12 P-47s launch an attack.

Enclosure (A)

- 3 -

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

21

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COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS GROUP NINE
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Enclosure (A) to Commander Task Group 78.3 MARIVELES-CORREGIDOR Action Report

- 1430 Beaching of LSTs begins.
- 1545 APDs, LCIs and LSMs, except LSM 218, returned to SUBIC and were alerted to lift reserve troops if so directed.
- 1600 Bombing and heavy bombardment of CORREGIDOR continues. Unloading progressing slowly at MARIVELES Beach, due to difficult beach conditions.
- 1640 Minesweepers again under fire from CORREGIDOR.
- 1829 Heavy bombing and bombardment continues.
- 1830 CTG 78.3 advises he will leave 5 LSTs partially unloaded, together with LCTs, Rescue and Salvage Craft, Rocket and Gunboats and 25 Army manned LCMs in MARIVELES BAY for night, proceeding with Flagship, sweepers and Cruisers to sea. Cruisers are instructed to act independently.
- 1830 to
- 2400 Proceeded to sea. Destroyer CLAXTON was instructed to inform CTG 78.3 if any gunfire occurred in MARIVELES BAY during the night.

16 February 1945 (D / 1)

- 0000 At sea west of objective area. This is the date set for landing on CORREGIDOR by airborne and waterborne troops.
- 0315 Of the five LCS(L) gunboats stationed on screening duties at MARIVELES BAY, three exploded and one was hit and beached, as a result of a vigorously executed "suicide" boat attack. (Later prisoner of war information indicates about 30 were launched from CORREGIDOR.)
- 0652 CONYNGHAM reports a boat which looks like Jap suicide boat. Appears out of gas.
- 0656 CTG 78.3 orders small boat be shot up. Boat exploded when hit.
- 0715 Remains of small Jap PT boat picked up. All craft warned about mines which may have been cut during yesterday's sweep.
- 0745 Scheduled air strike on CORREGIDOR begun. Many B-24s hit target all over the island.
- 0810 Destroyer CLAXTON is observed surrounded by floating mines. she sank four. LCI(S) sent to help in mine destruction.
- 0829 C-47s observed coming in with 503rd Parachute Battalion.

Enclosure (A)

- 4 -

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

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- 0836 First Paratroopers observed leaving planes. A few fall wide, but most directly on top of the "ROCK". No apparent opposition although machine gun fire is later reported. At this same time 25 LCMs and 2 LCTs left ORANGE Beach, MARIVELES BAY, for BLACK Beach on CORREGIDOR.
- 0912 PC 1119 ordered to destroy a mine ahead of formation.
- 0940 Bombardment of CABALLO ISLAND begins, also heavy firing all along landing beach. Considerable attention given to CABALLO ISLAND by planes and ships.
- 1015 First wave of 5 LCMs leaves line of departure.
- 1022 Heavy rocket fire on beach. Machine gun and forty millimeter fire observed from Japs in caves. This fire is hitting near rocket boats.
- 1028 Troops of first wave have landed on beach. Troops are standing up. No fire on beaches at this point at this time.
- 1032 Land mine exploded on beach, wrecking vehicle. Mortar fire noticed from hill on left flank of beach. Second wave lands on beach. An LCI apparently was injured by fire noted at 1022 above.
- 1034 Paratroopers observed on plateau.
- 1036 Third wave is fired upon while approaching beach. Third wave lands.
- 1041 LCI(R)s discharge additional rockets on flanks of beach. Enemy fire from CABALLO ISLAND is observed again. This is taken under heavy fire from Destroyers and Cruisers.
- 1044 Wave six held at line of departure until mortar and gun fire is cleared off beach area. Troops are now reported across the neck of the island. Paratroops are still limited to the plateau where they dropped.
- 1045 Boats retracting as rapidly as they are unloaded. An enemy PT boat near transport area exploded, leaving no trace.
- 1052 All waves clear of beach. Resistance is developing on the north coast of the neck of CORREGIDOR. Heavy bombardment on specific targets continues.
- 1110 Air coordinator aloft reports no activity on roads east of landing beach.
- 1111 Sixth wave of 2 LCTs delayed until mortar fire is silenced. This is accomplished by heavy Destroyer fire up the ravine on the left flank of the beach.
- 1235 Second paratroop drop begins with apparently good results. Wind stronger than for the morning drop.

Enclosure (A)

- 5 -

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

23

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Enclosure (A) to Commander Task Group 78.3 MARIVELES-CORREGIDOR Action Report

- 1400 503rd Parachute Regiment reports increasing small arms and machine gun fire on descending Paratroopers. Landing casualties from this and other causes increasing.
- 1515 Colonel JONES assumed command of troops ashore on CORREGIDOR, relieving Rear Admiral STRUBLE.
- 1515 to
1930 Heavy bombardment and bombing on call continues during this period. Arrangements made for ships at MARIVELES and at CORREGIDOR to retire from area except supportind Destroyers.
- 2004 Underway in Flagship, proceeding seaward from objective area.
- 2005 to
2400 On departure star shell illumination is observed from support Destroyers left behind.

17 February 1945 (D / 2)

- 1055 Resupply echelon, consisting of 4 LSMs for MARIVELES and 2 LSMs for CORREGIDOR beached and commenced unloading.
- 1310 HIDATSA struck mine while salvaging LCS(L) 27.
- 1630 503rd Infantry Division reinforcements in 5 APDs arrived off BLACK Beach (CORREGIDOR). Prepared to land in seven waves, each wave consisting of 4 LCPRs.
- 1700 First waves of 4 LCPRs landed with gunfire opposition.
- 1715 Sporadic machine gun fire still being encountered.
- 1800 Landing completed with no Naval personnel casualties. One LCPR was sunk and two were stranded on beach.
- 1825 LSM 38 assisted LSM 52 to retract from BLACK Beach. They joined four LSMs from ORANGE Beach for return passage to SUBIC, under escort.

18 February 1945 (D / 3)

- 1249 Flagship and PC 1133 arrived on BLACK Beach, CORREGIDOR.
- 1315 CTG 78.3 instructs support Destroyers to conserve ammunition where practicable.

Enclosure (A)

- 6 -

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

24

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1630 All gunfire support and Naval matters having been provided for, CTG 78.3 leaves objective area for SUBIC BAY.

19 February 1945 (D / 4)

through

5 March 1945

This period was spent at SUBIC BAY, with trips to CORREGIDOR, closing out various details of bombardment, sweeping and salvage problems related to the BATAAN-CORREGIDOR Assault. On 4 March 1945, Rear Admiral STRUBLE turned over operations in objective area to Vice Admiral BARBEY.

Enclosure (A)

- 7 -

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

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Enclosure (B) to Commander Task Group 78.3 MARIVELES-CORREGIDOR Action Report

PART III

REPORT OF NAVAL GUNFIRE

1. (a) The gunfire support plan for the Southern BATAAN and CORREGIDOR Attack Group, directed Task Group 77.3 to issue the necessary directives and to conduct the preliminary bombardment on D - 2 and D - 1; to provide call and counter battery fire on D-Day and D / 1, and to provide close covering of minesweeping operations on D - 2 through D / 1.

(b) The plan provided for close support by Destroyers, LCS(L)s and LCI(R)s of Task Group 78.3, for the scheduled landings on D-Day and D / 1, respectively Phase 1 and Phase 2.
2. (a) Task Group 77.3 bombarded enemy positions on Southern BATAAN, CORREGIDOR, CABALLO, EL FRAILES and CARABAO ISLANDS; and supported minesweeping operations on D - 2 through D / 1. Units of this group were available for call fire on D-Day to D / 2.

(b) On D - 2, they supported minesweeping operations and conducted bombardment according to plan. Several direct hits were observed on pill boxes and gun positions.

(c) The scheduled bombardment on D - 1 was carried out and minesweepers were supported by counter battery fire on CORREGIDOR. Several of our units were hit by fire from enemy guns emplaced in well camouflaged cave positions on CORREGIDOR. Some of the guns were eventually silenced by Destroyer fire at short range.

(d) The landing at MARIVELES and minesweeping operations were supported by scheduled bombardment and counter battery fire on CORREGIDOR on D-Day. Only one Jap gun, which was quickly silenced by the counter battery fire of Cruisers and Destroyers, opened up on the transport area.

(e) On D / 1, CORREGIDOR and adjacent islands were heavily bombarded by this task group prior to the parachute drop. Minesweepers were again furnished support. Units of the group were on station for call fire on D / 2 day but were not used.

(f) A bombardment of TERNATE TOWN on the east coast of MANILA BAY was carried out on D / 3, as requested by the Army.
3. During the MARIVELES Landing, Task Group 78.3 provided the following support:

(a) PICKING and WICKES took station to left and right, respectively, of the boat lane in the entrance of MARIVELES BAY and effectively covered the shores on both sides of the bay, the beach area, and the shore at end of bay with

Enclosure (B)

- 1 -

REPORT OF NAVAL GUNFIRE

26

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Enclosure (B) to Commander Task Group 78.3 MARIVELES-CORREGIDOR Action Report

5-inch fire, as scheduled from H-Hour minus 45 minutes to H-Hour minus 10 minutes. Cross fire was used effectively to cover the shore on both sides and fire was shifted to the flanks when LCI(R)s and LCS(L)s approached the line of fire.

(b) Three LCI(R)s took station ahead of leading boat wave and delivered normal rocket and 40 mm fire on beach area, hauling off to the left to provide fire support on that flank. Three LCI(R)s proceeded with the leading wave and made a rocket attack on the north shore of the bay, effectively covering a Japanese camp in that area. This group then supported the landing by patrolling in the area to the right of the boat lane.

(c) Two LCS(L)s patrolled the left flank of boat lane and four patrolled on the right flank, delivering rocket, 3"/50 and 40 mm fire on adjacent hills.

(d) Call fire was not needed.

(e) No casualties were reported.

(f) A heavy air strike by 24 B-24s was made on shores and hills in the vicinity of the bay during the scheduled fire by the Destroyers, **without interference.**

4. During Phase TWO - CORREGIDOR - Task Group 78.3 provided:

(a) YOUNG took station to north of CORREGIDOR; PICKING took station to south of CORREGIDOR to west of boat lane; and the WICKES took station to the right of the boat lane in CABALLO BAY. The paratroop drop was at H-Hour and the landing was made at H-Hour plus 120 minutes. The Destroyers delivered scheduled fire against beaches, caves and pill boxes from H-Hour plus 60 minutes to H-Hour plus 117 minutes, effectively silencing guns in caves and pill boxes. WICKES, which was stationed to the right of the boat lane, delivered fire at the caves in case of cliff to the west and covered the beach area. PICKING, stationed on the left of the boat lane, covered the beach area, pill boxes, and caves in MALINTA HILL. YOUNG, stationed to the north of CORREGIDOR, covered the rear of the beach areas, pill boxes and caves in MALINTA HILL. Destroyers were assigned to areas with limiting lines of fire to prevent damage from overs and **ricochets**, and fire was shifted to flanks as vessels in boat lane approached the line of fire.

(b) Two LCI(R)s made a normal rocket attack on beach area ahead of leading boat wave, cleared the boat lane to the left and supported the landing by 40 mm fire into caves to west. Four LCI(R)s proceeded with the leading wave and supported the landing by patrolling in the general area to the east of boat lane, engaging targets of opportunity with rocket and 40 mm fire.

(c) One LCS(L) was assigned to each flank of the boat lane and patrolled on flank engaging targets of opportunity.

(d) Call fire was not requested by the Shore Fire Control Parties on D plus 1. Counter battery fire and fire on targets of opportunity was carried on throughout the day.

(e) No casualties were reported.

Enclosure (B)

- 2 -

REPORT OF NAVAL GUNFIRE

27

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Enclosure (B) to Commander Task Group 78.3 MARIVELES-CORREGIDOR Action Report

- (f) Guns in caves were silenced by ships closing to ranges of a thousand yards or less and firing directly into entrances.
5. (a) As requested by the Army, interdiction fire was furnished on the road east of PARANG on BATAAN by CLAXTON and SAUFLEY on night of D-Day to D plus 1.
- (b) On the night of D plus 1 to D plus 2, interdiction fire was furnished the Army on BATAAN by CLAXTON and illumination was furnished the forces on CORREGIDOR by ABBOT.
- (c) Call fire and illumination for forces on CORREGIDOR continued from D plus 2 through D plus 16 from CLAXTON, SAUFLEY, DYSON, THATCHER and CONVERSE. Two ships were on station at a time except on D plus 9, D plus 10 and D plus 11, when an additional Destroyer was requested by the Army. One Destroyer was maintained on station from D plus 12 through D plus 16, when the operation was taken over by CTF 78.
- (d) Shore Fire Control Parties from the 592nd Joint Assault Signal Company were assigned to each of the three battalions and to the Regimental Commander making the assault on Southern BATAAN. Although call fire was not used, they provided a useful means of communication with the forces ashore. Communications with NGLO at Regimental Command Post was established at H-Hour plus 64 minutes.
- (e) On CORREGIDOR, one shore fire control party jumped with paratroopers and one was landed with the assault battalion. Communication was established with the Shore Fire Control Party that accompanied the Paratroopers at H-Hour plus 2 hours and 29 minutes, and proved to be the only means of communication with them. Communication was established with the Shore Fire Control Party that accompanied the assault battalion at H-Hour plus 3 hours and 30 minutes. The Shore Fire Control Parties on CORREGIDOR operated continuously from D plus 1 to D plus 12, controlling Naval Gunfire during this time and acting as a means of communication with the forces ashore.

(f) AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES AS OF D PLUS 12 DAY

PICKING	1106 5"/38 AA Com; 28 5"/38 Com; 130 - 40 mm.
WICKES	1271 5"/38 AA Com; 1207 - 40 mm.
YOUNG	756 5"/38 AA Com; 6 5"/38 WP; 350 - 40 mm.
CONYNGHAM	10 5"/38 AA Com; 500 - 40 mm.
CLAXTON	710 5"/38 AA Com; 10 5"/38 Com; 92 5"/38 ILL.
SAUFLEY	2543 5"/38 AA Com; 70 5"/38 ILL; 2196 - 40 mm.
DYSON	1300 5"/38 AA Com; 21 5"/38 Com; 120 5"/38 ILL; 300 - 40 mm.
THATCHER	1032 5"/38 AA Com; 98 5"/38 ILL; 2096 - 40 mm.
CONVERSE	1960 5"/38 AA Com; 10 5"/38 Com; 160 5"/38 ILL; 16 5"/38 WP; 800 - 40 mm.
LCS(L)s	806 3"/50; 9629 - 40 mm; 264 - 4.5 rockets.
LCT(R)s	5188 - 40 mm; 5966 - 4.5 rockets.

Enclosure (B)

- 3 -

REPORT OF NAVAL GUNFIRE

28

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Enclosure (C) to Commander Task Group 78.3 MARIVELES-CORREGIDOR Action Report

PART IV

OWN AND ENEMY DAMAGE

(A) Damage and Losses Suffered by Own Forces

<u>Name of Ship</u>	<u>Date</u> <u>Incurring</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Cause</u>	<u>Extent of Damage</u>
LCS(L) 7	16 Feb.	Mariveles	Struck by Q-Boat	Sunk
LCS(L) 26	16 Feb.	Mariveles	Struck by Q-Boat	Sunk
LCS(L) 49	16 Feb.	Mariveles	Struck by Q-Boat	Sunk
LCS(L) 27	16 Feb.	Mariveles	Struck by Q-Boat	Beached to prevent sinking.
LCI(R) 338	16 Feb.		2 hits from probable 3" shore battery shell fire.	Minor. Distribution panel damaged. 1 hole below water line.
LCI(R) 340	16 Feb		Shore fire and small arms fire from BLACK BEACH.	Minor damage. Mast shot off above conning tower. Minor damage to electric wiring.
LCI(R) 341	16 Feb		Shore battery shell fire	Direct hit on pilot house. #1 gun inoperative. Engine telegraph and steering apparatus inoperative. Minor damage.
LSM 169	15 Feb	Mariveles	Mine	Serious. Point of contact Frames 10 to 14, port side. Compartment from Frames 9 to 17 opened at seam. Ship gutted by fire.
FLETCHER (DD445)	14 Feb	Off Corregidor	Probable 6" shore battery shell fire	Minor.
HOPEWELL (DD681)	14 Feb	Off Corregidor	Shore battery shell fire.	Moderate
YMS 48	14 Feb	Off Corregidor	Medium caliber shore battery shell fire.	Serious fire damage from shell hit, later sunk by own gunfire.
LAVALLETTE (DD448)	14 Feb.	Mariveles	Mine	Serious
RADFORD (DD446)	14 Feb	Mariveles	Mine	Moderate. Able to proceed under own power.

Enclosure (C)

- 1 -

OWN & ENEMY DAMAGE

29

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Enclosure (C) to Commander Task Group 78.3 MARIVELES-CORREGIDOR Action Report

<u>Name of Ship</u>	<u>Date</u> <u>Incurred</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Cause</u>	<u>Extent of Damage</u>
HIDATSA (ATF 102)	17 Feb.	Mariveles	Mine	Moderate.

- (B) Intelligence Information indicates that about 30 Japanese Q-Boats were launched from CORREGIDOR on the night of D-Day. Six Q-Boats by suicide tactics exploded in pairs against the sides of three LCS(L)s, which sank immediately. The fourth Q-Boat exploded near LCS(L) 27 and caused considerable damage. LCS(L) 27 definitely destroyed five and probably six Q-Boats in the progress of the attack. The other Q-Boats in the attack were probably sunk or self-destroyed. A large number of Q-Boats were destroyed in the caves on CORREGIDOR by Destroyer gunfire and a number were captured intact by our troops after landing.

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Enclosure (D) to Commander Task Group 78.3 MARIVELES-CORREGIDOR Action Report

PART V

ADEQUACY OF CGC - MEDICAL - AIR SUPPORT

ADEQUACY OF CGC

1. Communications. The radio equipment of a CGC approximates that of an AGC and provides facilities for communication channels ordinarily required in an amphibious landing. The unavoidable proximity of transmitters to receivers imposed by the size of the ship produces internal interference which reduces the efficiency that might otherwise be expected from an installation of its excellence.
2. The limitation of space that restricts the desirable placement of equipment is evident likewise in the small size of the Coding Room, Communication Office, and Staff Shelter when detailing and stationing personnel for the execution of a plan and later in the SOPA administration of the objective area.
3. Berthing Facilities. Staff accommodations in the INGHAM allow for 26 officers and 19 enlisted men on a reasonable basis. Additional berthing on cots on the upper deck has been arranged, for lack of other space, and permits handling some additional officers and men on a temporary basis. The additional accommodations are undesirable in rainy weather and, of course, do not have any locker or other facilities.
4. Ten officers and forty-five men are required to man the communication facilities of a CGC, which leaves only sixteen officers' billets available for other Staff officers and no spaces for other enlisted staff personnel. During an operation, when Army personnel come on board, additional temporary arrangements are made to handle their berthing. Under such conditions, the ship is ~~very~~ **overcrowded**.
5. Boat Facilities. During the planning stage of an operation, numerous conferences and direct contact between the staffs involved are most desirable. The INGHAM only has two small motor dory type boats. This shortage of boats on a CGC tends to limit the number of conferences and the contacts between staffs that would otherwise be held and is an undesirable feature of a CGC.
6. Planning. The efficiency of planning on a CGC is limited, due to the berthing facilities and the lack of boat facilities as previously indicated, and by the lack of mechanical facilities for the production of amphibious plans and by the lack of planning space in which to produce them. It is often very desirable to issue maps, charts, photographs and other reproductions in connection with an amphibious plan. Such facilities are not available on a CGC and the issue of the plan is limited by a lay-out which can be mimeographed.
7. Recapitulation. In brief, a CGC is a miniature AGC capable of functioning as a command ship in a satisfactory manner for small scale operations requiring only facilities and personnel on a minor level. When an operation develops beyond a small scale and requires a majority of the complement of an amphibious group staff for its planning and execution, a CGC becomes inadequate.

Enclosure (D)

- 1 -

ADEQUACY OF CGC

31

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Enclosure (D) to Commander Task Group 78.3 MARIVELES-CORREGIDOR Action Report

MEDICAL

8. Medical planning for the BATAAN-CORREGIDOR Operation provided for emergency and definitive major surgical care for all casualties until Army medical facilities became available ashore, as well as for adequate medical and nursing care for all casualties enroute to the evacuation base at SUBIC.
9. Two LSTs, converted to casualty care, were staffed with surgical teams and with sufficient supplies and equipment to furnish adequate medical and surgical treatment at the far beach. Each surgical team consisted of four doctors and approximately fifteen hospital corpsmen. Complete operating room facilities were improvised in the port side troop compartment spaces and the entire tank deck was arranged as a large receiving and post operative ward. One hundred cots were set up on this deck. The more serious cases were retained in the troop compartment berths adjacent to the operating room, for quietude and special nursing. The normal patient load for each ship was one hundred litter and one hundred ambulant cases.
10. The LST 667 and LST 613 were the two vessels employed. The former accompanied the convoy from the staging area on 14 February 1945, and received casualties on 15 and 16 February. The LST 613 arrived in the combat zone on 16 February and received casualties after the LST 667 had a capacity load of litter cases, plus 108 Navy (mostly) and Army survivors. These two ships alternated a daily ferry service to the CORREGIDOR Area up to and including 27 February, at which time facilities ashore were available for air evacuation. The 21 February trip of the LST 613 was cancelled because of generator trouble and on that date 18 casualties were returned to SUBIC BAY by the U.S.S. DYSON.
11. A majority of the serious cases were extensive burns, resulting from fire and explosions aboard the damaged ships, and compound fractures resulting from paratroop landings.
12. A total of 1087 casualties were evacuated to SUBIC BAY Area by the LST casualty ships, 1007 Army and 80 Navy patients. The dead were sent ashore at MARIVELES, for burial by the Army Graves Registration Service. The remains of the dead enroute to the evacuation base were delivered to the Army at SUBIC for burial.
13. The ability of these surgically staffed LSTs to render immediate aid to seriously wounded men, to provide adequate shock, whole blood and penicillin therapy, and to accomplish indicated major operative procedures upon direct receipt of casualties from the far beach, proved life saving in many instances and justified the use of this type of casualty converted ship for future operations.

AIR SUPPORT

14. Planning Phase.

- (a) The planning phase of this operation was extremely short, thus precluding the usual joint conferences. One conference was held aboard the INGHAM, in which representatives of all the forces involved were present and most of the topics of joint interest were discussed and agreed upon at this conference.

Enclosure (D)

- 2 -

MEDICAL - AIR SUPPORT

32

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Enclosure (D) to Commander Task Group 78.3 MARIVELES-CORREGIDOR Action Report

(b) Subsequent to the conference, close liaison was maintained between the Attack Group Commander, the 5th Air Force and 309th Bomb Wing. The Army Air Liaison Officer accompanied the Air Force representatives upon their return to 5th Air Force Headquarters, MINDORO, where details of the Air Plan were worked out and written in the form of an Air Force directive to its subordinate units. A copy of this directive was delivered to 309th Bomb Wing Headquarters by the Army Air Liaison Officer upon his return to SUBIC BAY and the operations officer of the 309th Bomb Wing was thoroughly briefed on all phases of the operation at this time.

(c) The Air Force directive was rewritten in a different form and appended to the Operation Plan as the Air Annex. The 5th Air Force furnished a communication plan, designating the frequencies and call words to be used in connection with air support and fighter direction. This plan was slightly modified and included in the Operation Plan as the Communication Appendix to the Air Annex.

(d) An air support team was organized, utilizing the Army Air Liaison Officer and Air Officer, three officers and one enlisted man provided by 5th Air Force Headquarters, and twelve Navy enlisted men provided by the Senior Commander Support Aircraft, SEVENTH Fleet. This team did not have an opportunity to operate as a team, nor participate in a "dry-run" prior to D Day.

(e) In general, the proposed plan for the employment of air support aircraft included the following:

(1) Thorough and continuous reconnaissance of the objective area, all roads on the BATAAN PENINSULA, and the BATAAN and CORREGIDOR coasts would be conducted through D-Day and D plus 1.

(2) Bombing and strafing targets would be assigned to aircraft on air alert in accordance with the following priority.

- (a) Targets specifically requested by ground forces.
- (b) Surface targets within the objective area.
- (c) Targets of opportunity as reported by aerial reconnaissance planes.

(3) Fighter aircraft of the Combat Air Patrol would be used for bombing missions at any time during their scheduled patrol, providing no bogie plots were being reported, but these aircraft would be used for strafing missions only at the termination of their scheduled patrol, if strafing targets were evident at that time.

(4) If PT boats could be released, two or more fighters from the Combat Air Patrol would be assigned the mission of conducting a coordinated fighter - PT boat sweep up the east coast of BATAAN.

(5) Smoke planes, when present, would be employed to assist in the protection of friendly forces (shipping or beachhead) if taken under attack by enemy shore batteries or enemy air forces.

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Enclosure (D) to Commander Task Group 78.3 MARIVELES-CORREGIDOR Action Report

15. Execution Phase

(a) The actual execution of this operation insofar as air support was concerned, very closely followed the pattern outlined in the Air Plan, with the exception that approximately twice the number of airplanes reported on station than were scheduled. The support aircraft controller afloat assumed control at first light on D-Day and retained control until 1618 ITEM on D plus 1, at which time control was passed to Support Aircraft Party ashore. Throughout this period, the cooperation of the Naval gunfire control officer, the ships under his control, the airborne coordinator, and the crews of all the airplanes that participated in support missions was excellent, thus insuring well coordinated air and Naval gunfire support of the landing forces. The greater portion of air attacks conducted were not in close support of ground or Naval forces, however on the few occasions in which close support missions were required, they were conducted without mishap and favorable results were achieved.

(b) Due to the light opposition encountered in the MARIVELES assault and the subsequent advance inland, very little air support on the BATAAN PENINSULA was required. Therefore, practically all the available air was concentrated on CORREGIDOR and CABALLO ISLANDS, both of which offered an inexhaustible supply of air targets. Throughout D-Day and D plus 1 these islands were subjected to incessant air and Naval bombardment. Generally, Naval gunfire was not permitted while air attacks were in progress on the islands, and air attacks were restricted while Naval gunfire was being conducted, but on some occasions the two forces conducted simultaneous attacks on widely separated objectives on the islands. In spite of the sustained and heavy attacks on CORREGIDOR and CABALLO, some strongpoints, which were inaccessible to both air attack and Naval gunfire, remained intact and eventually had to be taken by the ground forces.

(c) On D-Day support aircraft flew a total of 325 sorties and dropped a total of 480 tons of bombs. On D plus 1 a total of 174 sorties were flown and 201 tons of bombs were dropped. The two-day total amounted to 499 sorties and 681 tons of bombs. These figures include both support and Combat Air Patrol missions.

(d) The paratroop drops were well executed and according to plan. All paratroopers landed on the Island, but a few landed on the side of a cliff near the water and were unable to climb upwards to their objective. Consequently, they were forced to descend to the beach and were evacuated by PT boats.

(e) Fighter direction during this operation assumed a less important function than it had in past operations. This condition existed as a result of the minor enemy air threat and due to the fact that the majority of the convoys made the run to and from the objective area under the cover of darkness.

(f) In general, the support rendered by the Air Forces was excellent and it is considered that the destruction accomplished by the combined efforts of the Air and Naval forces played a major role in the success of the operation. The results obtained by the action of these supporting forces undoubtedly forestalled a great amount of opposition to the paratroop and assault ground forces.

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Enclosure (D) to Commander Task Group 78.3 MARIVELES-CORREGIDOR Action Report

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Comments and Recommendations

16. RADIO EQUIPMENT

Comment

Some delay in communication with the Shore Fire Control Party that landed in the assault was caused by the difficulty in moving the SCR 284 radio, with which the 592nd JASCO was equipped, to the spotting station on top of MALINTA HILL.

Recommendation.

It is recommended that the SCR 284 Radio be replaced with one that is less bulky and more easily handled.

17. UNDERWATER DEMOLITION TEAMS

Comment

Two floating obstructions at the sides of MARIVELES HARBOR entrance and one heavy buoy about fifteen feet under water in the center of the Harbor Entrance, hindered the minesweeping operations. The floating obstructions which were known to be there were sunk by destroyer gunfire. The presence of the submerged buoy was not known. The sweeping of the Harbor was not thoroughly completed due primarily to this buoy. The loss of sweep gear on the submerged obstruction prevented that area from being thoroughly swept. The use of an underwater Demolition Team, working in coordination with the minesweeping operation, would probably have developed the presence of the submerged buoy. The early removal of it and the other buoys would have been desirable.

Recommendation

It is recommended that an Underwater Demolition Team be made available if minesweeping operations of any extent are involved.

18. JAPANESE REACTION TO MINESWEEPING

Comment

The Japanese did not open up their batteries on D - 2, while minesweeping and bombardment operations were being conducted, although the minesweepers were within range of their guns on many occasions. This would indicate an intention to keep the location of their guns concealed until the minesweepers were actually cutting a mine field which they considered of importance, or a landing was actually being made.

19. MINESWEEPING

Comment

In the CORREGIDOR Operation, it became desirable to cut out part of a large mine field southeast of the island before the whole area was swept, in order to provide a swept area for the gunfire support ships. In conducting this sweep, 76 mines were cut on the first pass. The mine destruction vessels were unable to destroy them immediately and the current drifted most of these mines over the unswept part of the field. Circumstances may not always permit a choice of where the initial sweep of a field will be made, but when they

Enclosure (D)

- 5 -

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

35

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By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

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COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS GROUP NINE
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Enclosure (D) to Commander Task Group 78.3 MARIVELES-CORREGIDOR Action Report

do permit it, existing currents should be taken into account. The Fire Support Group Commander has commented that on D-Day he was thankful for the small swept area between CORREGIDOR and BATAAN which, limited as it was, permitted him to place his ships in position to cover Northern CORREGIDOR as far east as BATTERY POINT.

20. ELECTRICALLY CONTROLLED MINES

Comment

Subsequent to sweeping the mine field area north of CORREGIDOR to a depth of eighty feet, close explosions occurred as surface craft passed through the area. It appears that the field was similar to the one later found in GUIMARAS STRAIT, where an electrically controlled Japanese mine field was discovered. In this field the presence of a ship was communicated to a mine control station by a magnetic loop which, through a photo electric cell and other devices, fired the mines in a specific area without any personnel required to be on watch.

21. MINESWEEPING SUPERVISION

Comment

More mines were swept during this operation than in any previous PHILIPPINE operation, from fields widely separated and often being swept simultaneously by separate minesweeping units. The senior minesweeping officer was, in addition to being commanding officer of a minesweeper actively engaged, the division commander of his type and the Task Unit Commander.

Recommendation

On a large minesweeping operation it is recommended that an experienced minesweeping officer be assigned whose sole duty will be to plan the operation and supervise its execution, without the restriction imposed by being the commanding officer of a unit engaged in conducting a portion of the task.

22. DESTROYER TACTICS

Comment

Two of the destroyers in the Support Group were mined at the entrance to MARIVELES HARBOR. Small vessel's fire did not sink the floating buoys and it was necessary to employ destroyers for the destruction of the buoys moored at the entrance. A YMS or other small vessel should have been used for mine destruction in the sweeping of the Harbor.

Recommendation

It is recommended that appropriate tactical instructions covering the operation of destroyers supporting minesweepers be prepared and issued. The avoidable danger incident to closing the sweepers unduly should be emphasized.

23. FIRE SUPPORT

Comment

The Support Group covered the minesweeping operations, pre-D-Day bombardments of BATAAN and CORREGIDOR, and counter battery fire in support of the landing.

Enclosure (D)

- 6 -

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

36

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COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS GROUP NINE
Fleet Post Office - San Francisco

Enclosure (D) to Commander Task Group 78.3 MARIVELES-CORREGIDOR Action Report

The gunnery was of a high caliber and the group displayed aggressiveness and determination throughout the operation.

24. CLOSE FIRE SUPPORT

Comment

Destroyers of the Escort Unit supported minesweeping operations and provided close-in and counter battery fire for the landings and in support of the advance of the ground troops after the landing. These destroyers also furnished night gunfire support and night illumination. The Inshore Support Unit rendered excellent close fire support. The close fire support of the Escort and Inshore Support units was a considerable factor in allowing the troops to land with few casualties.

25. AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE

Comment

On D - 1, a heavy expenditure of ammunition was made by the Support Group. The Commander Support Group estimated that his ships might be depleted with another day of heavy firing. In order to meet such a contingency, the Heavy Cruiser Unit, alerted at LINGAYEN, was ordered to the objective area. It also became additionally desirable to make the MARIVELES landing the next day, as scheduled, so the ammunition expended in support of the minesweeping operations would also support the landing.

26. SCREEN

Comment

Of the protective screen established to protect the beachhead on D-Day, three gunboats were lost and one damaged in the night attack by enemy Q-Boats at the entrance to MARIVELES HARBOR. This may have been due in part to their anchored condition or to the lack of an alert watch on all ships. One gunboat, by alert action, sank five Q-Boats before the sixth exploded close aboard and damaged her.

Recommendation

It is recommended that, where shipping at a beachhead is required to remain overnight, a reinforcing screen of small boats be used to supplement whatever other screens employed. It is believed that the small boats will be better able to detect the approach of Q-Boats and swimmers than gunboats or larger craft are.

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Enclosure (E) to Commander Task Group 78.3 MARIVELES-CORREGIDOR Action Report

PART VI

PERSONNEL, PERFORMANCE, CASUALTIES

1. Casualties. Casualty reports as obtained by individual action reports of all Group Units, are summarized as follows:

(a) U.S.S. FLETCHER (DD445)	6 killed; 5 wounded.
(b) U.S.S. RADFORD (DD446)	3 killed; 4 wounded.
(c) U.S.S. LA VALLETTE (DD448)	6 killed; 23 wounded.
(d) U.S.S. HOWELL (DD681)	7 killed; 11 wounded.
(e) LCI(R) 225	2 wounded (minor)
(f) LCI(R) 337	3 wounded (minor).
(g) LCI(R) 338	2 killed; 4 wounded (3 seriously).
(h) LCI(R) 341	3 wounded (minor).
(i) YMS 48	3 missing; 4 wounded.
(j) HDATSA (ATF-102)	5 killed; 3 missing; 8 wounded.
(k) LSM 38	1 wounded (minor - backfire of own gun).
(l) LSM 52	3 wounded (minor - shrapnel from LSM 38).
(m) LSM 169	1 killed; 1 missing; 18 wounded (of these 3 officer).
(n) LCT 729	2 killed; (1 officer and 1 enlisted man).
(o) LCS(L) 27	2 killed; 20 wounded (approximately).
(p) LCS(L) 7	Not reported.
(q) LCS(L) 26	Not reported.
(r) LCS(L) 49	Not reported.

Personnel Performance

- The boat crews and landing craft crews performed in a cool and efficient manner while under enemy fire on the CORREGIDOR Beach. The performance of the Army LCM crews was excellent.
- The minesweepers were under heavy shore fire from CORREGIDOR on a number of occasions. Their splendid performance of duty again attests to the fortitude of the minesweeping personnel.
- The commanding officer of a cruiser commented: "The coordination between the several elements, landing force, including paratroopers, bombardment and fire support forces, minesweepers and Army Air appeared to be the best which has been achieved to date". From the viewpoint of the Task Group Commander, the coordination between the Naval Gunfire and the Air was excellent.
- The Support Group, assisted by heavy air strikes, quickly silenced the Japanese batteries on CORREGIDOR on D-1 day, in support of the minesweeping operations and on D-Day in support of the landing in MARIVELES. Their performance was aggressive and determined.
- Two destroyers of the Support Group, which were hit by gunfire, handled their battle casualties capably and continued participation in the operation.

Enclosure (E)

- 1 -

PERSONNEL, PERFORMANCE, CASUALTIES

38

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Enclosure (E) to Commander Task Group 78.3 MARIVELES-CORREGIDOR Action Report

7. Destroyers of the Escort Unit and the Inshore Support Unit provided very effective close fire support for the landings and in support of the advance of the ground troops. Their support was a considerable factor in allowing the troops to land with few casualties.
8. The performance of the Naval Gunfire Liaison Officers ashore, in maintaining communications and close coordination with the destroyer gunfire support unit, was excellent.
9. The personnel of the Salvage and Rescue Unit rendered prompt assistance to damaged ships.
10. The Motor Torpedo Boats conducted a number of offensive sweeps and reconnaissance missions in an excellent fashion. The personnel were enthusiastic in executing assigned tasks.

Enclosure (E)

- 2 -

PERSONNEL, PERFORMANCE, CASUALTIES

39

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File No. FE25/ A16-3
Serial No. FF-0068

SEVENTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

A16-3(2)

JUL 7 1945

S-E-C-R-E-T

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to:
CTG 78.3 secret ltr.,
serial 00874 of 29
June 1945.

From: Commander Task Force SEVENTY-EIGHT.
(Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force)
To: Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet.
Via: Commander SEVENTH Fleet.
Subject: Action Report - MARIVELES-CORREGIDOR Landings,
15-16 February 1945.

1. Forwarded.

2. The leadership, planning and execution of this very important operation were excellent. The efficiency and cooperation of all task units involved were exemplary. The personnel of all units exhibited noteworthy qualities of fortitude, aggressiveness, determination and alertness.

D. E. Barbey
D. E. BARBEY

Copy to:
CTG 78.3 (ComPhibGrp 9)

7 1509

40

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By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

UNITED STATES FLEET
COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET

Reg. No. 7251
R.S. No. 7 1509

A16-3(2)(F-3-4/bc)

Serial

001943
SECRET
S-E-C-R-E-T

19 JUL 1945

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on:
CTG 78.3 Secret ltr.,
serial 00874, of
29 June 1945.

From: Commander Seventh Fleet.
To : Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.

Subject: Action Report - MARIVELES-CORREGIDOR Landings
15-16 February 1945.

1. Forwarded.
2. Commander Task Group 78.3 and the officers and men under his command are congratulated on the skillful and efficient execution of this mission.
3. By copy of this endorsement, Commander Seventh Amphibious Force is directed to insure that the comment contained in paragraph 2 of this endorsement is made a part of the record of Commander Task Group 78.3 (Commander Amphibious Group 9).

T. C. Kinkaid

Copy to:
Com7thPhibFor
ComPhibGrp 9

T. C. KINKAID

1945 JUL 26 11 29
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
FLAG OFFICE
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41